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INTRODUCTION
It is often the case that the transcendent contrasts oddly with the immanent 
from the Western point of view as Western thought is often permeated with 
bifurcation, of which all sorts of entities or phenomena are arrayed one against 
the other.1 Holding onto such segregational mode of thought inevitably leads 
to myriad incongruities in the universe, thus setting numerous things in 
implacable hostility. The instances of antithesis of this kind might be infinitely 
multiplied. In contrast, an examination of the Chinese thought sheds light on 
a realm of aesthetic harmony where a sharp divide between the immanent 
and transcendent is absent. For those accustomed to dichotomist thinking, 
this may be utterly unintelligible, but for the Chinese, it was not even an issue 
of contention, because such differentiation simply did not exist. The burden 
of my paper, then, is to argue that this entirely different picture of the world 
1 Thomé H. Fang, “A Philosophical Glimpse of Man and Nature in Chinese Culture,” 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 (December 1973): 7, doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6253.1973.
tb00638.x
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arose out of unique Chinese imagination. 
AN AESTHETIC CONTEMPLATION OF BOUNDARIES 
Zhuangzi epitomizes this ambiguity of boundaries beautifully in the 
qiwulun (齊物論) chapter. In his dream, Zhuangzi saw himself transformed 
into a flitting butterfly, and later when he awoke, he could not help but wonder 
if he was in reality a butterfly dreaming of being a human. While dreamscapes 
may be a sublime creation of the slumbering imagination - surrealistic and 
provoking a sense of otherworldliness, dreams can also appear to be as lucid 
as the “real” world. In other words, the waking “reality” may also transcend 
into an ineffable dreamlike state and vice versa. 
The story is too familiar to require further elaboration, but the point is 
this: Zhuangzi does recognize that objectively, “there is a distinction between 
himself and the butterfly” (周與蝴蝶則必有分矣). However, transcendence 
can still occur by means of opening up our imagination in order to be 
able to accommodate the myriad things without discrimination. A radical 
transcendence to a foreign realm would be uncalled for. Zhuangzi, by virtue 
of being himself, was always deferentially engaged in the world of humans, 
but his stories indubitably revealed his knack for rendering what we think to 
be grounded in reality in an unfamiliar way, in an attempt to challenge our 
conventional ways of perceiving.
TIANREN HEYI 天人合一 – A CORRELATIVE WORLDVIEW
The notion of tianren heyi (天人合一)is a central component of Chinese 
thought with pervasive influence till this day. The meaning of this concept 
evolved throughout history, and by tracing its development, we can also relate 
it to the breaking down of the transcendent-immanent dichotomy. 
The Heaven (tian 天) and man (ren 人) categories were already present 
in antiquity, but it was particularly during the Han Dynasty, when Dong 
Zhongshu (董仲舒) highlighted the convergence and harmony of tian and 
ren, that this interrelatedness was stressed upon, and such a mode of thinking 
through the two categories became quite rooted in the Chinese mentality. 
However, how these two tiers interacted was not definite. For instance, in 
his monumental Shiji (史記), the Grand Historian of China, Sima Qian (司
馬遷), wrote that he needed to examine the realm of Heaven and the realm 
of man (究天人之際) as he was fascinated by the capriciousness of history. 
Unlike Dong Zhongshu though, Sima Qian was uncertain about a direct 
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correspondence between the two spheres. Dong Zhongshu saw humanity as 
a replica of heaven and conferred rich and deep cosmic meanings onto human 
actions. In spite of their differences, it is evident that these two categories were 
already firmly established. 
Apparently, in high antiquity, the realms of Heaven and man were kept 
distinct. This, we get a greater understanding from Bodde’s work:
Anciently, men and spirits did not intermingle. At that time there 
were certain persons who were so perspicacious, single-minded, and 
reverential that their understanding enabled them to make meaningful 
collation of what lies above and below, and their insight to illumine what 
is distant and profound. Therefore the spirits would descend into them. 
The possessors of such powers were, if men, called hsi (shamans), and, if 
women, wu (shamannesses). It is they who supervised the positions of 
the spirits at the ceremonies, sacrificed to them, and otherwise handled 
religious matters. As a consequence, the spheres of the divine and 
the profane were kept distinct. The spirits sent down blessings on the 
people, and accepted from them their offerings. There were no natural 
calamities. 2
That kings still needed the assistance of shamans in performing rituals 
shows that the idea of tianren heyi back then was considered an exclusive 
right of the royalty. However, during Confucius’ time and later on when the 
Hundred Schools contended and flourished, a reinterpretation of this concept 
took place. This reinterpretation is important because the access to the realm 
of Heaven was no longer a royal monopoly. When it became universalized, 
Confucius was thus able to say that at fifty, he knew the decree of Heaven3 
and averred that a junzi (君子) stands in awe of the ordinances of Heaven4. 
This implies that the idea of tianming (天命) underwent a subtle shift from 
reinforcing the legitimacy to rule to something that everybody had access to. 
2 Derk Bodde, “Myths of Ancient China”, in Mythologies of the Ancient World, ed. 
by Samuel Noah Kramer (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1961), p.390
3 Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, (Beijing 北京: zhong hua shu ju 
中華書 局, 2012), p. 54 Lunyu 2.4: 子曰：吾十有五而志于學，三十而立，四十
而不惑，五十而知天命，六十而耳順，七十而從心所欲，不踰矩。」
4 Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 173 Lunyu 16.8: 孔子曰：「
君子有三畏：畏天命，畏大人，畏聖人之言。小人不知天命而不畏也，狎大
人，侮聖人之言。」
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Moreover, Confucius believed that he was vested with Heavenly-endowed 
virtue and tasked to transmit the culture (wen 文) of the past. He was fully 
confident of this and therefore remained composed and unafraid whenever he 
was held captive or faced dangerous situations during his decades of wandering. 5 
The changing meanings of tianren heyi shows a reinterpretation of tradition 
rather than a total rejection of it. In this reinterpretation, the reformulated 
ideology stands in continuity with history but its political overtones of tianming 
were played down. Instead of leaving the transcendent and immanent as two 
independent and mutually exclusive concepts, the Chinese sought to reconcile 
them. Perhaps the statement ‘Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my 
people hear’6 in the Classic of History gives this very idea its full expression. 
ROLE OF THE MIND-HEART (XIN 心) IN CHINESE 
SPIRITUALITY
So, what constitutes the core of the Chinese imagination? How exactly 
did it collapse the alleged transcendent-immanent dichotomy? Based on this 
writer’s understanding, the solution to the ontological bifurcation lies in the 
xin (心), or more commonly rendered as the mind-heart.
It is perhaps little wonder that the notion of xin should be so closely 
associated with Neo-Confucianism given the overwhelming concentration 
on xin following the rise of xinxue (心學), or ‘Learning of the mind-heart’. 
However, on closer examination, the idea of xin was already long present in 
Chinese thought. It was just that Neo-Confucian developed it to its full maturity. 
The Mencian thesis is that by fully penetrating our minds, we can be led to 
comprehend our self-nature and eventually understand Heaven7.’ Similarly, in 
the Zhuangzi, there is the mention of the famous ‘fasting of the mind-heart’ (
心齋 xinzhai) to gain communion with the Dao. All these examples signify the 
direct linkage between tian and ren by turning inwards and seeking resources 
from oneself, instead of searching beyond the realm of humanity, as is often 
the case in Western thought. The function of the xin finds its quintessential 
expression in Chan Buddhism as well. In the Platform Sutra, it is said that 
“From the outset the Dharma has been in the world; being in the world, it 
transcends the world. Hence do not seek the transcendental world outside, 
5 See Lunyu 7.23, 9.5 for such instances.
6 See Shangshu尚書 “Taishi” 太誓chapter: 「天視自我民視，天聽自我民聽。」
Also quoted by Mencius, see Mencius 5A:5.
7 Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 356
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by discarding the present world itself.”8 Thus, it is possible that the notion of 
xin was already a defining feature in Chinese thought and served as a form 
of cultural conditioning so that when Chan Buddhism started teaching about 
seeing into one’s own nature and becoming a Buddha, it was readily accepted. 
In addition, xin could possibly have played a part in the Chinese epistemology 
as well. Knowledge and knowing may not necessarily be established through 
empirical understanding in early Chinese thought. It is often intuitive, 
going beyond what contemporary thinkers would dub as scientific, yet it has 
nothing to do with superstitions either. Mote makes an important point in his 
explanation of what intuition is:
“Intuition is not reason, for the process by which one intuitively knows 
is not subject to analysis and reasoned understanding. Nonetheless to intuit 
is to know and to know with great certainty (even should the knowledge so 
acquired prove to be erroneous); it is not like faith which demands that one 
believe without knowing.”9 
Indeed, experience of direct, immediate knowing seems to be made 
possible through the xin. For instance, Zhuangzi feels that language is at once 
limiting and divisive. Although ideas cannot be adequately conveyed through 
words, they can be realized in the mind-heart. Thus, the xin is the medium 
through which the transcendent joins with the immanent.
To end off this section, the conversation between Wang Yangming and his 
friend, as follows, will also serve our purpose of understanding the xin well:
The friend pointed to flowering trees on a cliff and said: 
You say there is nothing under heaven external to the mind. These flowering 
trees on the high mountain blossom and drop their blossoms of themselves. 
What have they to do with the mind?
Wang replied: 
Before you look at the flowers, they and your mind are in a state of silent 
vacancy. As you come to look at them, their colours at once show up 
clearly. From this you can know that these flowers are not external to 
your mind.10
8 Philip Yampolsky, The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (New York: Columbia 
University Press), p.140 
9 Frederick W. Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China (zhongguo sixiang zhi yuanyuan) 
2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1989), p.19
10 Wang, Yangming, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings, 
trans. Wing-tsit Chan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p.222.
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On the surface, what is internal seems to be diametrically opposed to the 
external. But ontologically speaking, they are intertwined. Just as the flowers 
are devoid of significance without the mind, so both the internal and external 
are inseparable. The external cannot be negated, rather, it is the mutual 
engendering that drives one’s creative imagination.11
DIVINITY WITHOUT THEOLOGY
The Western theological perspective is typically associated with theism. 
Given the ontological dualism in the form of a vertical disjunction, religion in 
the sense of a wholly transcendent seems to require the support of an unflinching 
faith. In the interest of brevity, this paper shall not attempt to prove, or disprove 
religious metaphysics, but suffices to point out that the absence of theology 
is a salient feature of the Chinese tradition. This is very much in the spirit of 
Zhuangzi if we consider this observation in light of the statement “as to what 
lies beyond the universe the sage admits its existence but does not theorize”.12
In the Lunyu, it is recorded that when Confucius offered sacrifice to the 
dead, he felt as if the dead were present. When he offered sacrifice to other 
spiritual beings, he felt as though those spirits were present too. Hence, he said, 
“If I do not participate in the sacrifice, it is as if I did not sacrifice at all.”13 From 
this, it is apparent that when Confucius made sacrifices, he did not concern 
himself with the existence of spiritual beings. Even if they really did exist, that 
fact itself would be irrelevant. To genuinely participate in sacrificial rites is to 
feel a deep sense of reverence, it is the emotions evoked that counts. 
 
The cogent intimations of reality that imagination provides is also eloquently 
evidenced in the Book of Rites: 
The severest vigil and purification is maintained and practised in the inner 
self, while a looser vigil is maintained externally. During the days of such vigil, 
the mourner thinks of the departed, how and where he sat, how he smiled 
11  Yuet Keung Lo 勞悅強, Wennei Wenwai: zhongguo sixiang shi zhong de jingdian quanshi 
文內文外:中國思想史中的經典詮釋 (taibei: taida chuban zhongxin, 2010), p.vi
12  Qian Mu錢穆, Zhuangzi zuan jian 莊子纂箋, (Taipei台北市: Dongda tushu gongsi東
大圖書公司, 2011), p.18.
13  Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 64 (Lunyu 3.12: 祭如在，祭
神如神在。子曰：「吾不與祭，如不祭。」)
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and smoke, what were his aims and views, what he delighted in, and what he 
desired and enjoyed. By the third day he will perceive the meaning of such 
exercise. On the day of the sacrifice, when he enters the apartment [of the 
temple], he will seem to see [the deceased] in the place [where his spirit-tablet 
is]. After he has moved about [to perform his operations], and is leaving by 
the door, he will be arrested by seeming to hear the sound of his movements, 
and will sigh as he seems to hear the sound of his sighing…14
The above describes in some detail the psychological state of the filial son in 
mourning. As Fung Yu-Lan notes, “to gain communion with the dead through 
abstraction”15 is to give satisfaction to the emotions of affectionate longings. 
In the Han lexicon Shuowen jiezi (說文解字) compiled by Xu Shen (許慎), 
etymologically, the Chinese character 廟 miao, where ancestral worship takes 
place, is an iconic representation for the countenance of the ancestor.16 This 
corroborates with the above view that sacrificial rites are about expressing one’s 
deep-seated feelings through imagining the spiritual presence of the dead. 
Due to the absence of a sharp division between the transcendent and 
immanent, the Chinese civilization has often been criticized of lacking religious 
import. Are the Chinese really irreligious people then? To answer this question, 
one has to probe much deeper. Does one need a religion to be religious? What 
is a religion anyway? In a sense, a ‘religion’ is a mere label, an appellation 
given to a particular system of belief. If religions all share the same essence in 
awakening an internal quest, then naming is ultimately divisive. Seen in this 
light, perhaps the whole question about Chinese religiosity is meaningless 
because the West do not share the same sort of metaphysical understanding, 
and thus their charge is groundless to begin with. 
AN EMIC VERSUS ETIC PROBLEM
Throughout the paper, there has been a focus in attempting to argue that 
the early Chinese people were constantly engaged in some form of imagination 
that has helped shaped Chinese thought and produced a beguiling philosophical 
worldview. Such an imagination offers us a reconciliation of the ‘actual’ and 
14 Fung Yu-Lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derke Bodde (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1952), I, p.351-52. Fung quotes from the Liji禮記.
15 Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, I, p.352
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‘transcended’ world, which continues to have an enormous purchase on 
our current imagination, through which this tradition will live on. That a 
tradition can be anything but invented is hard to conceive of, for it is a human 
creation, one that necessarily reproduces and reinvents itself. This paper is thus 
a retrospective study, and so its tenability is also a matter of framing. But it has 
to be emphatically pointed out that framing is determining, it is not merely 
about putting things into context. Hence, therein lies an emic versus etic 
problem, an implication of this paper which warrants some discussion. Simply 
put, this is a question of interpretation whereby a particular problématique may 
be considered from either the insider or the outsider’s perspective. (It may also 
be suggested that the insider and outsider are equally capable of producing 
both emic and etic accounts, but for definitional purpose and to simplify 
things a little, this need not concern us here.) The key is just that any attempt 
to understand the past necessarily involves historical inquiry into the subject 
matter. Ergo it is important to distinguish between emic and etic accounts so 
as to better understand our understanding. 
For instance, during the time of Confucius, the House of Zhou had 
fallen into disuse, and rites and music had fallen into neglect. It was under 
such circumstances that Confucius committed himself to preserving historical 
records by compiling anthologies. From conventional sources, we know that 
this included the editing and arranging of the Classic of Odes (shijing 詩經), 
Classic of History (shangshu 尚書) among others. Despite being a descendant 
of the Shang, Confucius staunchly defended the Zhou. While the Zhou empire 
continued its decline, he nevertheless remained resolute in ‘following the 
Zhou’ . Although some modern historians have argued that the Duke of Zhou 
is at best a shadowy figure in ancient history,17 he was indubitably a luminous 
figure in the eyes of Confucius, and the surest evidence that the Mandate of 
Heaven had indeed passed to the House of Zhou. 
Regardless of the fact that Confucius might have misconceived the past, 
this meaningful reconstruction of a historical and cultural symbol would not 
have been able to come about without a dose of creative imagination. The Zhou 
that Confucius had in mind was a romanticized one – a fantasy of a laudable 
moral universe which was no less a reality for him. The ontological possibility 
of such a realm was made plausible by relying on the extant literary culture 
17 Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 65. Lunyu 3.14: 子曰：「周監
於二代，郁郁乎文哉！吾從周。」
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established. Confucius had effusively praised the resplendent literary culture 
of Zhou18, and this eventually became the sustenance of his imagination. In 
the compilation of the Classic of Odes for example, he was selective in the 
material, expunging undesirable works which were the ones that probably 
did not exemplify the normative order of ancient times. As recorded in the 
Analects, Confucius believed that for the three hundred and five pieces that 
he retained, they may all be succinctly described in a word as having not 
deviated19. Clearly, Confucius had projected his own ideals onto his works. 
His ingenuity lies in re-writing tradition, re-organizing and synthesizing a 
culture while building his own cultural enterprise on it. 
On the other hand, from Confucius’ point of view, he was a self-proclaimed 
lover of antiquity, a ‘transmitter’ instead of ‘creator’20, intent on upholding the 
integrity of history. He continued the honoured tradition of recording and 
memorializing human deeds of the past. He also sought to celebrate and glorify 
the literary culture of the Western Zhou, which he ardently admired and desired 
to revive. Indeed, Zhou culture was great, but according to Confucius, it already 
had before it the examples of two previous dynasties, and thus its achievements 
were also built upon them. Therefore, in urging his contemporaries to follow 
the wisdom embedded in the golden past, Confucius did not think that he was 
proposing something radical. In a Gadamerian sense, Confucius does stand in 
continuity to tradition because he sees himself recapitulating and transmitting 
what has been handed down to him21. 
Is there, then, a ‘right’ interpretation? Both are relevant, and perhaps a more 
nuanced question deserving of some contemplation would be if Confucius had 
actually intended the social evolution that drew ideological support from his 
teachings. Oftentimes by choosing to take a historical approach, one tends to 
think it is safe enough to assume that the results of the study offer an objective 
point of view. We fall into a ridiculous delusion that the historical approach 
allows us to be observers who write from a thoroughly detached point of view. 
But the truth is that; because we are situated as part of this creation of history, 
18 Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China, p.29
19 Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 65.
20 Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 53. Lunyu 2.2: 子曰：「詩三
百，一言以蔽之，曰『思無邪』。」
21 Zhu Xi 朱熹, si shu zhang ju ji zhu 四書章句集注, p. 93. Lunyu 7.1: 子曰：「述而
不作，信而好古，竊比於我老彭。」
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we also inevitably write from a contextualized point of view. 
CONCLUSION 
In the twilight zone between transcendence and immanence, the Chinese 
finds reality and the fullest meaning of life. As Bertrand Russell insightfully 
points out:
“Instinctive happiness, or joy of life, is one of the most important 
widespread popular goods that we have lost through industrialism and 
the high pressure at which most of us live; its commonness in China is a 
strong reason for thinking well of Chinese civilization.”22
‘Instinctive happiness’ is certainly a very apt phrase for this Chinese asset. 
Something instinctive surely comes from within, yet it also cannot arise without 
influence from without. The prima facie mundane self is clearly the locus for 
restoring the equilibrium and harmony between the self and that which is 
external to it. Pursuing this further, we may conclude that the secular is also 
the sacred, and vice versa in the Chinese imagination.
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